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THE (IL)LEGITIMACY OF
BANKRUPTCIES FOR THE BENEFIT
OF SECURED CREDITORS
Charles W. Mooney, Jr.∗
The desirability of secured creditor bankruptcies is undoubtedly
a polarized issue. On one hand, some argue that secured creditor
bankruptcies should be dismissed outright. On the other, others assert
that secured creditor bankruptcies should not be automatically dismissed because they can be beneficial in certain circumstances. This
Article explores this tension by initializing a dialog between the advocates and the critics of secured creditor bankruptcies. Through this
dialectic approach, this Article concludes that, even though secured
creditor bankruptcies may have the capacity for mischief, they should
still be permitted so long as they are governed by carefully drawn limitations.
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I.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

This Article explores the legitimacy—or illegitimacy—of filing and
maintaining a case under the Bankruptcy Code1 when the sole or principal beneficiary or beneficiaries of the case would be a secured creditor or
secured creditors.2 In the situation posited here, the application of the
usual distributional priority rules would not produce any distribution for
the general, unsecured creditors of the debtor. In the prototypical case
virtually all of the assets of the debtor would be subject to secured claims
securing obligations that exceed the value of the collateral, i.e., the secured creditor would be undersecured and there would be no equity in
the collateral for the benefit of the debtor’s estate. I refer here to such a
bankruptcy case as a “secured creditor bankruptcy.”
I note at the outset that this project originally was conceived as a
joint effort with Professor Bruce A. Markell.3 Sadly, scheduling issues
eventually prevented our formal collaboration.4 While I assume full responsibility for the final product, I am indebted to Professor Markell for
his enormously helpful input. Professor Markell and I have differing
views on how bankruptcy law should deal with secured party bankruptcies.5 My views generally fall into the legitimacy side of the argument and
Professor Markell’s on the other side. Although my goal here is to set out
the best policy arguments on each side, I have no doubt that Professor
Markell would have provided a more cogent and articulate account of
the illegitimacy point of view than I have managed to offer.
Following this Introduction, Part II of this Article offers a brief
overview of several bankruptcy-law-related settings and contexts in
which the appropriateness of a secured creditor bankruptcy might be
questioned. One typical situation involves a proposed sale of substantial-

1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2012). Unless otherwise noted, citations to “section” or “§” are to
sections of the Bankruptcy Code.
2. Unless the context requires otherwise, I refer throughout to the beneficiary “secured creditor” for convenience. But this reference should be understood to refer to the situation in which there
are multiple secured creditors as well.
3. Jeffrey A. Stoops Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law.
4. I have tried to remain faithful to our original goal of setting out the strongest policy arguments both for and against the legitimacy of secured creditor bankruptcies.
5. While we certainly share some common ground, our views differ substantially in several respects (albeit more sharply on some issues than others).
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ly all of a debtor’s assets under Bankruptcy Code section 3636 (a “363
sale”), often relatively early in a Chapter 11 case.7 Typically, the sale
would be free and clear of the secured creditor’s security interest (with
the secured creditor’s consent) and with the security interest attaching to
the proceeds for subsequent distribution to the secured creditor.8
Part II. A. of this Article deals with 363 sales. Part II.B of this Article
then addresses sales under a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization. Part II.C
then examines the circumstances under which a secured creditor bankruptcy might be converted to a Chapter 7 case or dismissed. Next, Part
II.D considers the practice of “gifting” in a secured creditor bankruptcy.
Under this practice, with the secured creditor’s consent a distribution is
made to or set aside for a person whose claim or interest is junior to the
secured creditor’s claim. The distribution or set aside ostensibly is made
from the secured creditor’s collateral, the benefit of which otherwise
would be received by the secured creditor alone (hence, the “gifting” of
the collateral). Finally, Part II.E of this Article offers a brief summary of
the (often inconsistent) treatment of secured party bankruptcies by the
courts. Part II.E also addresses in this context secured creditor “carveouts” from collateral.
I appreciate that under the current Bankruptcy Code and existing
case law many courts have the flexibility to embrace a wide variety of
approaches toward secured creditor bankruptcies and toward the doctrinal issues of bankruptcy law that those cases implicate.9 In general, I recognize that case law and secondary authority exist that both support and
oppose the appropriateness of secured creditor bankruptcies. For that
reason, Part III focuses primarily on the bankruptcy policy implications
of secured party bankruptcies—primarily policies that underpin Chapter
11.10 Part III asks and offers a range of answers to the question: How
should bankruptcy law treat secured creditor bankruptcies? Part III first
sets out two competing visions of secured party bankruptcies. One view
is generally critical and opposed, the “Against” position, and the other
generally supportive, the “For” position. Part III then proceeds to provide rebuttals and surrebuttals of the Against and For positions and to
discuss and critique the issues that they raise.

6. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2012); see CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 94–95
(2d ed. 2009).
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (authorizing the use, sale, or lease of property of the estate outside
the ordinary course of business). Although section 363(b)(1) also applies to the use and lease of property, for present purposes, sales under section 363 are most relevant. Consequently, this Article generally refers to “363 sales.”
8. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (permitting the sale of property of the estate “free and clear of any interest”).
9. Of course, any court may be bound by controlling precedent. See, e.g., United States v.
Aguiar, 737 F.3d 251, 261 (2d Cir. 2013) (“‘[B]inding precedent’ refers to the precedent of this Circuit
and the Supreme Court.”).
10. Accordingly, I generally eschew a detailed exploration of the best or strongest “doctrinal”
analyses and solutions.
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Throughout this Article, the focus is trained on the issues raised by
secured party bankruptcies. Thorough examinations of the broader
themes of sales under section 363 or under reorganization plans, dismissal, and gifting, for example, are beyond this Article’s scope.
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR SECURED CREDITOR
BANKRUPTCIES
A.

363 Sales

Section 363(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the trustee (or
debtor in possession11) to use, sell, or lease property of the estate “other
than in the ordinary course of business.”12 This right to dispose is permitted only “after notice and a hearing.”13 But the statute itself provides no
guidance as to the applicable standards that courts are to apply for approving or disapproving a 363 sale.14 Not surprisingly, a substantial body
of case law has filled in the gaps, although not always consistently. In
general, the court considers aspects of the transaction such as the adequacy and reasonableness of notice, the adequacy of the price, and the
good faith of the transferee.15
Most controversial are the 363 sales of all, or substantially all, of a
debtor estate’s assets. In many situations, there may be good reasons for
conducting such a 363 sale instead of providing for a sale under a confirmed Chapter 11 plan. But there also is cause for skepticism and caution in this context. In In re Lionel Corporation, the Second Circuit held
that there must be “a good business reason” for approval of the sale of a
substantial asset of a debtor outside of a plan of reorganization.16 In
Lionel, the debtor proposed to sell a controlling stake in another corporation, which was Lionel’s “most important asset.”17 The Lionel Creditors’ Committee’s insistence on the sale, the court reasoned, was “insufficient as a matter of fact because it is not a sound business reason and
insufficient as a matter of law because it ignores the equity interests re-

11. Subject to exceptions not relevant here, a debtor in possession has the rights and powers of a
trustee in Chapter 11. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2012).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1); see TABB, supra note 6, at 99.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 102(1) (explaining the meaning of “after notice and a hearing”).
14. Section 363(b)(1) does not by its terms require a court order approving a nonordinary course
disposition, but such an order is normally obtained in practice in order to provide necessary comfort to
a transferee. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.02[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th
ed. 2013) [hereinafter 3 COLLIER].
15. See id. at ¶ 363.02.
16. 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983).
17. Id. at 1065.
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quired to be weighed and considered under Chapter 11.”18 Other circuits
have followed Lionel.19
More recently the Second Circuit revisited the substantial asset 363
sale issue in a case in which the court upheld the bankruptcy court’s approval of the sale over the objections of certain creditors. The Second
Circuit discussed and cited Lionel with approval in In re Chrysler LLC.20
There, the court noted:
In the twenty-five years since Lionel, § 363(b) asset sales have become common practice in large-scale corporate bankruptcies . . . .
Resort to § 363(b) has been driven by efficiency, from the perspectives of sellers and buyers alike. The speed of the process can maximize asset value by sale of the debtor’s business as a going concern.21
Chief among the factors motivating the bankruptcy court’s approval
(and the Second Circuit’s affirmance) of the sale of the assets by Old
Chrysler (the Chapter 11 debtor in possession) to New Chrysler was the
need to preserve going concern value and to dispose of the assets before
any further deterioration occurred—the “melting ice cube” theory.22
The objecting secured creditors argued that the 363 sale was “an
impermissible [so-called] sub rosa plan of reorganization” because certain unsecured creditors of Old Chrysler were ending up with value (an
ownership interest in New Chrysler), ostensibly violating the “absolute
priority” rule because the secured creditors were not being paid in full.23
But the court pointed out that the bankruptcy court had made clear that
all of the value of the debtor’s assets was being distributed to the secured
creditors. The court further noted that the bankruptcy court found that
all of the equity ownership in New Chrysler was “entirely attributable to
18. Id. at 1071. Subsequent history illustrates the risks that are inherent in a substantial asset
sale. Lionel eventually sold the asset and received about $20 million more than it would have received
under the proposed sale for which approval was originally sought. Lionel Agrees to Sell Its 82% Stake
in Dale for $76.9 Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1985, at 37.
19. See, e.g., Stephens Indus. v. McClung, 789 F.2d 386, 389–90 (6th Cir. 1986); Inst. Creditors of
Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. (In re Cont’l Air Lines, Inc.), 780 F.2d 1223, 1226 (5th
Cir. 1986).
20. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 113–17
(2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009).
21. Id. at 115–16.
22. As the Chrysler court observed, “[w]ith its revenues sinking, its factories dark, and its massive debts growing, Chrysler fit the paradigm of the melting ice cube.” Id. at 119. The sale in Chrysler
yielded $2 billion, which was distributed to the secured creditors, against the backdrop of unrefuted
evidence of a liquidation value of only $800 million. Id. at 118. Moreover, “Chrysler was losing going
concern value of nearly $100 million each day.” Id. at 119. Relying on the Bankruptcy Court’s opinion
and the Second Circuit’s oral affirmance in Chrysler, as well as other Second Circuit 363 sale cases, the
Bankruptcy Court subsequently approved the 363 sale of the assets of General Motors. In re General
Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 491 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). Following the Second Circuit’s issuance of its
written opinion in Chrysler the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded to the Second Circuit to dismiss the appeal as moot. Chrysler, 558 U.S. at 1087 (2009); In re
Chrysler, 592 F.3d 370, 372 (2d Cir. 2010).
23. In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 118. Concerning the absolute priority rule and cramdown, see 11
U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2012). I address these issues primarily in connection with the discussion of gifting
in infra Part II.D.
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new value—including governmental loans, new technology and new
management—which were not assets of the debtor’s estate.”24
The Chrysler court also distinguished the Braniff Airways case.25 In
Braniff, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s approval (and affirmance of the bankruptcy court) of an asset sale because the debtor
“should not be able to short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11 for
confirmation of a reorganization plan by establishing the terms of the
plan sub rosa in connection with a sale of assets.”26 For example, the
transfer agreement in Braniff would have dictated “some of the terms of
a[ny] future reorganization plan[s]” and would have required a particular
allocation of proceeds under such a plan or else a valuable asset would
have been forfeited.27 In order to “specify the terms whereby a reorganization plan is to be adopted, the parties and the district court must scale
the hurdles erected in Chapter 11.”28 The Chrysler court acknowledged
that a sale of “substantially all of a debtor’s assets . . . may well be a reorganization in effect without being the kind of plan rejected in Braniff.”29
Applying the Lionel analysis, courts in the Second Circuit may approve
363 sales of substantially all of a debtor’s assets provided that there is a
“good business reason for the sale.”30
Two commentators outlined the pre-Chrysler case law on substantial asset 363 sales as follows:
Bankruptcy law, based on leading 1980s decisions in the Second and
Fifth Circuits, was largely in good shape doctrinally before Chrysler.
These decisions established that there must be an appropriate business justification for the sale, as exemplified by a business emergency or a deteriorating business situation best handled by a sale; the
sale cannot be a sub rosa plan of reorganization that de facto determines core terms more properly determined under section 1129
via its creditor protections; and if the plan does determine core section 1129 features, it can do so only if the court fashions a makeshift
24. In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 118.
25. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d
935 (5th Cir. 1983).
26. Id. at 940.
27. Id. at 939–40.
28. Id. at 940. As examples of these “hurdles,” the court cited 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012) (governing
disclosure requirements), 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2012) (concerning voting), 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2012)
(providing the best interest of creditors test), and 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (2012) (setting forth the
absolute priority rule).
29. In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 117. Notwithstanding the court’s conclusions, Chrysler has been
severely criticized. See generally Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy Reorganization
and the Troubling Legacy of Chrysler and GM, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375; Mark J. Roe & David A.
Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727 (2010); Todd L. Friedman, Note, The
Unjustified Business Justification Rule: A Reexamination of the Lionel Canon in Light of the Bankruptcies of Lehman, Chrysler, and General Motors, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 181 (2010). For a contrary
view, see generally Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 531 (2009). I do not engage this criticism here inasmuch as the only present purpose is to
outline the current state of the case law as necessary to set the stage for our consideration of secured
creditor bankruptcies.
30. In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 117.
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safeguard—a substitute that’s overall consistent with the mandates
of section 1129.31
It remains to be seen whether Chrysler and General Motors will
have a lasting and significant impact on the development of the law of
substantial asset 363 sales.32
An important aspect of most substantial asset 363 sales is the sale
“free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than
the estate” pursuant to section 363(f).33 In sales free and clear an important issue is whether one of the five conditions of such a sale have
been met.34 For present purposes of considering secured creditor bankruptcies, the most important condition is the consent of the entity whose
interest will be cut off—the relevant secured creditor.35 Given the assumption that the secured creditor is the principal beneficiary of the
bankruptcy case, we can further assume that the secured creditor will
consent.36 Another important issue is the type of “interest” that can be
cut off in a sale free and clear.37 Again, for present purposes the relevant
point is that a sale free and clear may be an important factor in the secured creditor’s preference for a sale in bankruptcy as opposed to enforcement outside bankruptcy.38
B.

Sales Pursuant to Plans of Reorganization

Section 1123(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “a plan
may . . . provide for the sale of all or substantially all of the property of
the estate, and the distribution of the proceeds of such sale among holders of claims or interests.”39 Thus, Chapter 11 clearly permits liquidation
plans. A plan in a secured creditor bankruptcy that provides for a liquidation is, in legal contemplation, quite unremarkable. But, wealth con31. Roe & Skeel, supra note 29, at 736.
32. See Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 871 (2014) (proposing a reserve to be set aside from sales
price at the time of a 363 sale, preserving postsale resolution of potential disputes about valuation and
priority).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012). See generally TABB, supra note 6, at 94–95.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1)–(5); see 3 COLLIER, supra note 14, at ¶ 363.06[2]–[6].
35. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(2) (providing that a trustee may sell property under section 363(b) or section 363(c) if “such entity consents”).
36. However, if a senior secured creditor consents but a junior secured creditor does not, then
the court must find that another condition has been satisfied as to the junior. In one interesting case,
on appeal the conditions held applicable to the junior creditor were determined to be not applicable.
The senior creditor who purchased at the sale cut off its own senior lien (through its consent) but took
subject to the junior lien! Although the bankruptcy court’s sale order was not stayed during the appeal,
the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that mootness protection of section 363(m) applied only to the sale and not to the “lien-stripping” (i.e., the “free and clear”) aspect of the sale).
Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW), 391 B.R. 25, 37 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008).
37. See 3 COLLIER, supra note 14, at ¶ 363.06[1], [7].
38. For example, a broad interpretation of “interest” (as the term is used in section 363(f)),
which would allow the sale to be free and clear of future claims under a successor liability theory,
could be very attractive to the buyer, and consequently to the secured creditor. With such protection
for a buyer the collateral may fetch a substantially higher sales price. See Id. at ¶ 363.06[7].
39. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4); see TABB, supra note 6, at 98.
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servation may dictate an early disposition (the “melting ice cube,” for
example) in a substantial asset 363 sale, as discussed above.40 As evidenced by section 1123(b)(4), such a liquidation under section 363 is not
necessarily inconsistent with the goals and purposes of Chapter 11.
C.

Conversion or Dismissal

In addition to objections to substantial asset 363 sales in secured
creditor bankruptcies, a party in interest (or a court, sua sponte) may
seek to have a Chapter 11 case converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation case
or dismissed. In this connection, section 1112(b)(1) provides, in pertinent
part:
[O]n request of a party in interest, and after notice and a hearing,
the court shall convert a case under this chapter to a case under
chapter 7 or dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in the
best interests of creditors and the estate, for cause unless the court
determines that the appointment under section 1104(a) of a trustee
or an examiner is in the best interests of creditors and the estate.41
Section 1112(b)(4), then, provides that “‘cause’ includes” a lengthy
list of examples.42 None of the enumerated examples suggest that the
mere fact of a secured creditor bankruptcy is of itself sufficient “cause”
for conversion or dismissal. However, one example of cause may be particularly pertinent in a secured creditor bankruptcy. Subsection
(b)(4)(A) holds that “‘cause’ includes . . . substantial or continuing loss to
or diminution of the estate and the absence of a reasonable likelihood of
rehabilitation.”43 Note that this is a two-prong test—loss or diminution
and unlikelihood of rehabilitation.
The ground for dismissal that probably is most relevant in a secured
creditor bankruptcy is the lack of good faith. Whether the absence of
good faith in the filing or maintenance of a Chapter 11 case constitutes
“cause” under section 1112(b)(1) or is an independent judge-made
ground, dismissal for lack of good faith (or, as alternatively described, for
bad faith) is well established in the case law.44 In assessing the absence of
good faith (or existence of bad faith) the courts generally focus on
whether there is an abuse of the Chapter 11 process or some form of misconduct.45
The subjective bad faith inquiry is designed to insure that the petitioner actually intends “to use the provisions of Chapter 11 . . . to reor-

40. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(A)–(P).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(A) (emphasis added).
44. On dismissal for lack of good faith, see generally 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1112.07
(Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2013) [hereinafter 7 COLLIER].
45. See, e.g., Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693, 702 (4th Cir. 1989).
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ganize or rehabilitate an existing enterprise, or to preserve going concern
values of a viable or existing business.” 46 Put conversely,
its aim is to determine whether the petitioner’s real motivation is
“to abuse the reorganization process” and “to cause hardship or to
delay creditors by resort to the Chapter 11 device merely for the
purpose of invoking the automatic stay, without an intent or ability
to reorganize his financial activities.”47
There is some authority supporting a dismissal for lack of good faith
because a reorganization is not likely, but these cases generally involve
additional factors bearing on good or bad faith.48 Otherwise, the first
prong of the two-prong test of section 1112(b)(4)(A) would be read out
of existence and superfluous.
D.

Gifting

Both gifting and carveouts in Chapter 11, whether in connection
with a plan of reorganization or a substantial asset 363 sale, raise several
potential conflicts with either the letter or the policies of Bankruptcy
Code, and in particular Chapter 11. I summarize these aspects of Chapter
11 at the outset of the discussion in this Subpart.49
Consider first certain relevant conditions for confirmation of a plan
in Chapter 11.50 For a plan to be confirmed each holder of a claim or interest in an impaired class51 who has not accepted the plan must receive
value of not less than the amount the holder would receive in a liquidation of the debtor under Chapter 7.52 This is colloquially referred to as
the “best interest of creditors” test (although it applies to holders of interests as well). Note that the best interests test applies to each holder.
Another requirement of confirmation applies to each class of claims or
interests. Each class must either accept the plan or not be impaired by

46. Id. (quoting In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 B.R. 549, 564 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981)).
47. Id. (quoting In re Thirtieth Place, Inc. v. Thirtieth Place, Inc., 30 B.R. 503, 505 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 1983)). In Carolin the Fourth Circuit also held that dismissal for bad faith requires not only a determination of subjective bad faith but also of “objective futility”—that a reorganization is not realistically possible. Id. at 700–01. The Eleventh Circuit, however, has held that bad faith alone is sufficient
for dismissal and that the potential for a successful reorganization does not override the determination
of bad faith. Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd. v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 849 F.2d 1393, 1394 (11th Cir. 1988).
48. See, e.g., C-TC 9th Ave. P’ship v. Norton Co., 113 F3d 1304, 1310 (2d Cir. 1997). As the C-TC
9th court observed, “[w]hen it is clear that, from the date of filing, the debtor has no reasonable probability of emerging from the bankruptcy proceedings and no realistic chance of reorganizing, then the
Chapter 11 petition may be frivolous.” Id. But there were other factors supporting the determination
of bad faith. For example, the Chapter 11 case essentially involved a two-party dispute and was in effect a litigation tactic. Id. at 1309.
49. I address other potential inconsistencies in our presentation of the cases for and against secured creditor bankruptcies in infra Part III.
50. See generally TABB, supra note 6, at 1132 (providing an overview of confirmation requirements).
51. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2012) (regarding classification); 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (concerning impairment).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
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the plan.53 In addition, if a class of claims is impaired, at least one impaired class must accept the plan (without taking into account any insider
acceptances).54
The so-called “cramdown” requirements are also relevant here. The
cramdown can be invoked if section 1129(a)(8) has not been satisfied because an impaired class of claims or interests has not accepted a plan. In
that situation the plan can be confirmed nevertheless under section
1129(b) “if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.”55 The statute does not define or explain the concept of unfair discrimination, although case law provides
guidance.56 However, the statute does address what is “fair and equitable
with respect to a class” in section 1129(b)(2), which incorporates what is
known as the “absolute priority rule.”57 With respect to a class of secured
claims a plan is fair and equitable if the holders receive, essentially, the
value of their secured claims.58 Of more interest in the context of gifting
and carveouts, however, it is the fair and equitable treatment of a nonaccepting class of unsecured claims. A plan provides fair and equitable
treatment of a class of unsecured claims if either the holders receive value equal to the allowed amount of their claims or if the holders of claims
or interests junior to the holders of the unsecured claims do not receive
“on account of such junior claim or interest any property.”59 For example, in a debtor’s simple capital structure, imagine an accepting class of
impaired secured creditors, a nonaccepting class of unsecured creditors,
and common shareholders. So long as the shareholders receive nothing
“on account of” their junior claims, the plan is fair and equitable for the
class of unsecured creditors.60 Hence the moniker “absolute priority” is
evoked—junior classes get nothing unless senior classes receive a full recovery, the senior classes’ priorities being “absolute.” 61

53. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1).
56. For a succinct overview of the judicial treatment of unfair discrimination, see Harvey R.
Miller & Ronit J. Berkovich, The Implications of the Third Circuit’s Armstrong Decision on Creative
Corporate Restructuring: Will Strict Construction of the Absolute Priority Rule Make Chapter 11 Consensus Less Likely?, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1345, 1387–90 (2006).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2); see also Miller & Berkovich, supra note 56, at 1347.
58. This can be achieved by the holder’s retention of liens and receipt of cash payments at least
equal to the amount of the allowed claim and with a present value at least equal to the collateral value.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i). Alternatively, fair and equitable treatment can consist of the holders’
realization “of the indubitable equivalent” of their claims. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). Another
alternative is for the collateral to be sold free and clear of the liens with the liens attaching to the proceeds, followed by treatment of the proceeds in accordance with clauses (i) or (iii) mentioned above.
59. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). There is an exception for individuals, which is not relevant
here.
60. Recall that by the time the issue of cramdown is reached, the court already has determined
that the best interests test under section 1129(a)(7) has been met for all of the holders in the nonaccepting class. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
61. See Miller & Berkovich, supra note 56, at 1347.
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Consider next absolute priority and unfair discrimination in the context of secured creditor gifting.62 For example, if the secured creditor gifts
a portion of its bankruptcy distribution to the old equity (interest holders), leaving the unsecured creditors to take nothing, does this violate absolute priority? Similarly, if the secured creditor gifts some unsecured
creditors but provides nothing to other unsecured creditors of equal
rank, does this amount to unfair discrimination? Cases dealing with these
and related issues turn on the factual and procedural settings and many
cannot be reconciled.63
Most would mark the beginning of the golden (or not) era of gifting
with a decision by the First Circuit more than twenty years ago in Official
Unsecured Creditors’ Committee v. Stern (In re SPM Manufacturing
Corp).64 SPM involved an agreement by a secured creditor with a Chapter 11 creditors’ committee to share with the debtor’s general unsecured
creditors proceeds of the collateral recovered by the secured creditor.65
The result of this agreement meant that a priority tax claim (for which
the debtor’s former management members were personally liable) would
not be paid. Following a sale of the collateral, the secured creditor sought
to recover the proceeds, a portion of which it proposed to distribute to
the committee for the benefit of the unsecured creditors. The bankruptcy
court denied the secured creditor’s request and ordered that the portion
of the proceeds intended for the unsecured creditors be paid instead to
the trustee for distribution according to the applicable priorities. 66 This
meant that the priority tax claimant would receive those proceeds. The
district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling. 67
The First Circuit reversed the district court. It explained:
[T]he distribution scheme of section 726 (and, by implication, the
priorities of section 507) does not come into play until all valid liens
62. Because my focus here is on secured creditor bankruptcies, I primarily address gifting by a
secured creditor as a tool for enhancing its recovery. However, cases involving gifting by unsecured
creditors, some of which I mention in the following discussion, also may bear on secured creditor gifting.
63. On gifting and associated issues, see generally Hollace T. Cohen, In re Armstrong World
Industries, Inc.: Absolute Priority Reigns Supreme, in NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW (2005); Michael Carnevale, Comment, Is Gifting Dead in Chapter 11 Reorganizations? Examining Absolute Priority in the Wake of the Second Circuit’s No-Gift Rule in In Re DBSD, 15 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 225 (2012); Richard L. Ferrell, Gifting Carve-Outs in Asset Sales Under § 363 Still Controversial, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2009, at 16; Lauren E. McDivitt, Comment, What Do You Mean There
Won’t Be Gifts This Year? Why Practitioners Cannot Rely upon Gifting Provisions in Chapter 11 Reorganization Plans in the Fifth Circuit, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1019 (2012); Miller & Berkovich, supra
note 56; Thomas E. Patterson, Chapter 11 Business Reorganizations: You Can’t Give it Away: Gifts,
Carveouts, Settlements and Other Incursions into Absolute Priority, SS029 ALI-ABA 531 (Am. Law.
Inst.–Am. Bar. Assoc. Course of Study), Apr. 28, 2011; Norman L. Pernick et al., Beware of Creditors
Bearing Gifts: A Primer on Sharing Property in Chapter 11, 22 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 725
(2013); Damian S. Schaible & Eli J. Vonnegut, SPM Manufacturing to Journal Register: Indicators of a
Successful “Gift Plan,” AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2009, at 14.
64. 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993).
65. See TABB, supra note 6, at 728 n.4.
66. In re SPM Mfg., 984 F.2d at 1310.
67. Id.
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on the property are satisfied. . . . If a lien is perfected and not otherwise invalidated by law, it must be satisfied out of the assets it encumbers before any proceeds of the assets are available to unsecured claimants, including those having priority (such as priority tax
creditors) . . . . Citizens held a valid lien on all of the SPM assets;
these were sold for $5 million. The bankruptcy court allowed
Citizens’ secured claim in that amount. Clearly, then, absent the order, the entire $5 million belonged to Citizens in satisfaction of its
lien, leaving nothing for the estate to distribute to the other creditors, including the I.R.S. The bankruptcy court’s order forced
Citizens to transfer to the estate a portion of its own $5 million
notwithstanding the court’s recognition of Citizens’ right to receive
that sum in full.
Because Citizens’ secured claim absorbed all of SPM’s assets,
there was nothing left for any other creditor in this case . . . . [I]t is
hard to see how the priority creditors lost anything owed them given the fact there would have been nothing left for the priority creditors after the $5 million was distributed to Citizens. The “syphoning” of the money to general, unsecured creditors came entirely
from the $5 million belonging to Citizens, to which no one else had
any claim of right under the Bankruptcy Code.68
Note that SPM was a Chapter 7 case (at the time of distribution) in
which the absolute priority rule did not apply. However, the distributional scheme under Chapter 7 is every bit as rigid as that under Chapter 11.
The relevant inquiry, then, is whether gifting is a permissible means of
allowing a junior creditor’s recovery to the exclusion of a senior creditor,
notwithstanding the otherwise applicable distributional regime (regardless of the applicable chapter). Also note that the gifting distribution was
to be made by the secured creditor, not by the trustee or under a plan.
Moreover, there was no dispute as to the secured creditor’s priority in
SPM.
Relying to some extent on SPM, gifting under a plan of reorganization by a secured creditor for the benefit of some classes of unsecured
creditors, to the exclusion of other creditors of equal rank, has been upheld over objections that it amounted to unfair discrimination.69 Such selective gifting under a plan of a portion of what otherwise would be received by classes of unsecured creditors in favor of some, but not all,
unsecured trade creditors also has been permitted as not unfairly discriminatory.70 Other courts have taken opposing views, holding that se68. Id. at 1312 (internal citations omitted).
69. In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R. 591, 611 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001); In re Parke
Imperial Canton, Ltd., No. 93–61004, 1994 WL 842777, at *11 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Nov. 14, 1994). In
Genesis the gifting also was for the benefit of the debtor’s former equity holders. In re Genesis Health
Ventures, 266 B.R. at 611.
70. In In re WorldCom, Inc., for example, the court stated that:
Any enhanced value received by holders of [certain claims] on account of contributions from other Classes is not a treatment of these Claims under the plan and does not constitute unfair discrimination. The greater value received by [certain creditors] as a result of the Contributions does
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cured creditor gifting in connection with plan of reorganization does not
excuse disparate treatment of creditors of equal rank that otherwise
would constitute unfair discrimination.71
Significant decisions in the Second and Third Circuits have substantially restricted the utility of gifting in those circuits. In In re Armstrong
World Industries, Inc.,72 the Third Circuit held that the proposed plan
violated the absolute priority rule by allowing former equity holders to
receive warrants for equity. The plan provided that if a particular class
did not accept the plan, then the warrants would be issued to another
class of creditors that would automatically gift them to the former equity
holders.73 The court distinguished SPM because it was a Chapter 7 case
that did not implicate the absolute priority rule.74 Moreover, the gifting
secured creditor distributed property—its collateral—that was not distributable under the Bankruptcy Code’s priority rules and the SPM gift
was a carveout from the secured creditor’s collateral.75 The warrants in
Armstrong, on the other hand, were created to end up in the hands of
former equity holders. After Armstrong, the District of Delaware Bankruptcy Court has allowed gifting in connection with a 363 sale and not in
the context of a plan or reorganization. In In re World Health
Alternatives, Inc.,76 the court approved a settlement in connection with an
asset sale under which claims against the secured creditor were released
and the secured creditor carved out of it collateral value for the benefit
of unsecured creditors.
The Second Circuit also held that a plan violated the absolute priority rule in In re DBSD North America, Inc.77 The DBSD plan allocated
not violate the Bankruptcy Code, because the Contributions are the result of other creditors
(holders of [certain claims]) voluntarily sharing their recoveries under the Plan with [certain other
creditors] . . . . The greater value received by [those other creditors] is not the result of the Debtors’ distribution of estate property to such creditors. Creditors are generally free to do whatever
they wish with the bankruptcy dividends they receive, including sharing them with other creditors, so long as recoveries received under the Plan by other creditors are not impacted.
In re Worldcom, Inc., No. 02-13533 (AJG), 2003 WL 23861928, at *60-*61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (internal citations omitted). See also In re Genesis Health Ventures, 266 B.R. at 612; In re M Corp. Fin.,
Inc., 160 B.R. 941, 964 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993) (permitting gifting by unsecured creditor under plan of
reorganization).
71. In re Sentry Operating Co. of Tex, Inc., 264 B.R. 850, 864–66 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that disparate treatment that is funded and determined by secured creditor does not excuse unfair
discrimination); see also In re Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc., 307 B.R. 889, 894–95 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
2004) (stating that unfair discrimination was partially funded by anticipated litigation recoveries as
well as gifting by secured creditor and consequently was a distribution of property of the estate; distinguishing SPM because SPM did not involve property of the estate or the confirmation process).
72. 432 F.3d 507, 509 (3d Cir. 2005).
73. For a sharp critique of the Armstrong court’s efforts to distinguish SPM and other earlier
cases and the court’s analysis in general, see Miller & Berkovich, supra note 56, at 1415–25.
74. In re Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.2d at 514.
75. Id.
76. 344 B.R. 291, 297–98 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006); see also In re TSIC Inc., 393 B.R. 71, 78 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2008) (approving a settlement over U.S. Trustee’s objection in which buyer in 363 sale funded
a trust for benefit of general unsecured creditors).
77. Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d 79, 97 (2d
Cir. 2010).
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about five percent of the equity in the reorganized debtor to the debtor’s
former equity holder. The debtor and first and second lien noteholders
exhausted all of the assets and the unsecured creditors were not entitled
to any distribution. Consequently, the former equity holder was receiving
value gifted by the second lien noteholders. In the court’s view, however,
the former equity received “property,” “under the plan,” and “on account of” its junior interest.78 Because the objecting creditor did not receive property of a value equal to the amount of its allowed claim, section 1129(b)(2)(B) was not satisfied.79 The court effectively eliminates
gifting under a plan as a permissible means of providing value to a junior
class when an intervening class of claims is not fully satisfied.80
The absolute priority rule and the prohibition of unfair discrimination are not the only bankruptcy policies that could be offended by gifting. In In re CGE Shattuck, LLC, the bankruptcy court declined to approve a “disclosure” (urging rejection of the debtor’s plan) of a secured
creditor’s “commitment” to provide a fifty percent dividend to certain
unsecured creditors if the secured creditor was relieved of the automatic
stay or the case was converted to a Chapter 7.81 The secured creditor contended that it was merely offering to share the proceeds of its collateral if
it were enabled to recover in a timely fashion, relying in part on SPM.82
The court rejected that contention, concluding that the secured creditor’s
commitment and proposed disclosure was an attempt to avoid the requirements and protections that would accompany a plan proposal.83 In
In re Goffena, the bankruptcy court refused to approve an agreement between a secured creditor and the trustee under which the creditor would
pay the trustee’s fees out of proceeds of collateral while not providing for
other administrative and priority claims.84 Once proceeds were received
by the trustee they would be property of the estate and distributable according to the distributional scheme of the Bankruptcy Code.85 In In re
Scott Cable Communications, Inc.,86 the bankruptcy court held that a
proposed liquidating plan violated section 1129(a)(9), which requires
payment in full of administrative expenses at confirmation,87 and section
78. Id. at 95–97.
79. Id. at 90–92.
80. Id. at 94–97. The court distinguished SPM as it was a Chapter 7 and because there is “clear
‘statutory support’ to reject gifting” under section 1129(b)(2)(B). Id. at 98. Moreover, because the secured creditor in SPM had obtained relief from the automatic stay, the court effectively treated the
gifted property “as no longer part of the estate.” Id. After DBSD, the WorldCom decision by the
Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York would not appear to have any continued vitality, at least not in the Second Circuit. See supra note 70. The Second Circuit had earlier reserved decision as to the efficacy and permissibility of gifting outside the plan context. See Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 461 (2d Cir. 2007).
81. In re CGE Shattuck, LLC, 254 B.R. 5, 8 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2000).
82. Id. at 10.
83. Id. at 12–13.
84. In re Goffena, 175 B.R. 386, 392 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1994).
85. Id. at 392.
86. 227 B.R. 596 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998).
87. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A) (2012).
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1129(d), which prohibits plans with the principal purpose of avoiding
taxes.88 The plan proposed to pay administrative and other priority claims
and general unsecured claims from proceeds of secured creditors’ collateral, but not the payment of capital gains taxes of the sale of the debtor’s
assets.89 Because the sale was to occur postconfirmation, the debtor argued that such taxes (administrative expenses) were not required to be
paid.90 The court rejected the debtor’s argument, finding that the administrative period extended to include the postconfirmation sale.91
E.

Secured Creditor Bankruptcies and Carveouts

Some cases and commentary address directly the issue of a secured
creditor bankruptcy, which is the principal focus of this Article.92 However, the case law is sparse and it is safe to say that no consensus has
emerged.
In United States Trustee v. GPA Technical Consultants, Inc.,93 the
court held that it was not appropriate to dismiss or convert the case notwithstanding that it appeared that the case was likely to benefit only the
secured creditor.94 Similarly, in In re Western Pacific Airlines, Inc.,95 the
court exercised its discretion not to dismiss even though the case was being directed by and for the benefit of the secured DIP financer.96
In contrast to these cases, consider In re Encore Healthcare
Associates.97 Encore involved a proposed 363 sale of all of a debtor’s assets for $2.5 million.98 The assets secured an obligation of more than $8
million.99 The sale proceeds were to be used to pay the costs of sale with
88. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(d).
89. In re Scott Cable Commc’ns, 227 B.R. at 598.
90. Id. at 600.
91. Id. at 600–01.
92. See generally Ferrell, supra note 63; Andrew L. Turscak, Jr & Alan R. Lepene, Must a Secured Creditor Pay to Play in Chapter 11?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2009, at 36; Jay R. Indyke &
Brent Weisenberg, Committee Issues: Carve-Outs; Liquidations for Benefit of Banks; Liability; Inconvenient Delaware Issues; Liquidation for the Benefit of Secured Lenders: An Unsecured Creditor’s
Committee Prospective, 041802 ABI-CLE 223 (Am. Bankr. Inst., Alexandria, VA), Apr. 18, 2002;
Robert J. Keach et al., A Chapter 11 Case Should Not Necessarily Be Dismissed Because It Principally
or Solely Benefits the Secured Creditor, 042006 ABI-CLE 7 (Am. Bankr. Inst., Alexandria, VA), Apr.
20, 2006; Judy A. O’Neill & John A. Simon, A Chapter 11 Case Should Be Dismissed If It Would Only
Benefit Secured Creditors, ABI 24th Annual Meeting (Am. Bankr. Inst., Alexandria, VA), Apr. 21,
2006; Patterson, supra note 63.
93. U.S. Trustee v. GPA Technical Consultants, Inc (In re GPA Technical Consultants, Inc.),
106 B.R. 139 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989).
94. Id. at 143 (“[T]here need not be any unsecured creditors in a bona fide reorganization, and
thus the only creditor interests to be taken into account may sometimes be secured creditors.”).
95. 218 B.R. 590 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998).
96. Id. at 595–97 (citing GPA with approval); see also Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Dick Corp., 351 F.3d
290, 291–94 (7th Cir. 2003). In Mellon, the secured DIP financer was granted a security interest in the
debtor’s preference actions. Although only the secured creditor stood to benefit from the preference
action, that was not a defense. “The operating business counts as an ‘estate’ without regard to the
identity (and priority) of those who will receive distributions eventually.” Id. at 293.
97. 312 B.R. 52 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2004).
98. Id. at 54–55.
99. Id. at 54.
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the balance remitted to the secured creditor.100 The court, sua sponte, denied approval of the sale procedures on the basis that the court would
not approve the sale itself.101 In the court’s view, there was no business
justification for the sale under the Lionel doctrine.102 The court cited with
approval a case reaching essentially the same result under similar circumstances.103
The Encore court distinguished (and apparently cited with approval) cases approving substantial asset 363 sales under different factual settings.104 The 363 sale of substantially all of the debtor’s assets was approved in In re Medical Software Solutions.105 In that case, there were
insufficient funds to continue operations, the assets were about to significantly decline in value, and there was a carveout from the secured creditor’s collateral to cover both administrative claims and a distribution for
general unsecured creditors.106 The court in In re Rausch Manufacturing
Co. also approved such a 363 sale.107 The court reasoned that the sale
would allow the buyer to continue the debtor’s business as a viable firm
with continuing employment of employees and continuing production. 108
In contrast, in Encore the debtor had “no operating business with employees that is preserved by reason of this [i.e., the proposed] sale as the
Debtor does not operate a business but merely leases real property.”109
It is not unusual for a secured creditor to carve out from proceeds of
its collateral funds to cover professional fees and other administrative
expenses, often in connection with the secured creditor’s postpetition
DIP financing order.110 Similarly, a secured creditor may agree to a
carveout from proceeds of a 363 sale to cover administrative expenses
and to fund a distribution to unsecured creditors, as in Medical Software
discussed above.111 Commentators have noted that in a secured creditor
100. Id.
101. Id. at 57–58.
102. Id. at 54–55, 57.
103. Id. at 56–57 (citing In re Fremont Battery Co., 73 B.R. 277 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987)). In
Fremont, the court held that there was no business justification for the sale because it effectively would
terminate the debtor’s existence and there would be no assets on which to base a plan. More relevant
to present purposes, the court noted that “the proceeds from the proposed sale would, at most, benefit
one creditor only. The sale would not create proceeds that would inure to the benefit of the unsecured
creditors.” In re Fremont Battery, 73 B.R. at 279.
104. In re Encore Healthcare Assocs., 312 B.R. at 57.
105. 286 B.R. 431 (Bankr. D. Utah 2002); see also In re Channel One Commc’ns, Inc., 117 B.R.
493 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990) (detailing why a quick sale was necessary to maximize going concern value and price was in excess of amounts secured by liens and encumbrances).
106. In re Medical Software Solutions, 286 B.R. at 440–42.
107. 59 B.R. 501, 503 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
108. Id.
109. In re Encore Healthcare Assocs., 312 B.R. at 57.
110. See In re Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 115 B.R. 34, 38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“[I]t has been the
uniform practice in this Court . . . to insist on a carve out from a super-priority status and post-petition
lien in a reasonable amount designed to provide for payment of the fees of debtor’s and the committees’ counsel and possible trustee’s counsel in order to preserve the adversary system. Absent such
protection, the collective rights and expectations of all parties-in-interest are sorely prejudiced.”).
111. In re Medical Software Solutions, 286 B.R. at 442.

MOONEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2]

3/30/2015 1:14 PM

THE (IL)LEGITIMACY OF BANKRUPTCIES

751

bankruptcy the secured creditor may be required to “pay to play”—i.e.,
to carve out of its collateral funds for the benefit of general unsecured
creditors.
The question typically arises in the context of a preplan confirmation section 363 sale involving the proposed disposition of substantially
all of a debtor’s assets where sale proceeds will be less than the aggregate
value of existing liens. One common method of appeasing an agitated
creditors’ committee under these circumstances is for the secured lender
to carve out a portion of its recovery for the benefit of unsecured creditors.112 In addition to appeasing a creditors’ committee, such a carveout
also may appease a court that otherwise might not tolerate a secured
creditor bankruptcy.
III. SECURED CREDITOR BANKRUPTCIES: THE CASES FOR AND
AGAINST
A.

Overview

In this Part, I alternatively assume the roles of Against and For.
Against first identifies particular aspects of secured creditor bankruptcies
that plausibly are objectionable and attempts to lay out the strongest,
most convincing, positive case for why such aspects actually are objectionable. For next identifies the aspects of secured creditor bankruptcies
that plausibly are beneficial and not objectionable and, again, attempts to
state the strongest, most convincing, positive case for why such aspects
actually are not objectionable. Then For and Against provide rebuttals
and surrebuttals of the cases against and for secured creditor bankruptcies. Most of the plausibly objectionable aspects of secured creditor
bankruptcies are mentioned in Part II’s discussion of the various relevant
legal issues that have arisen.113 For that reason, this Part proceeds to identify and analyze policy issues, but it is not a legal brief-like effort to make
the best cases for and against based on current case law. Indeed, under
existing law, a court (if not constrained by binding precedent) could
reach the results favored by either Against or For. To be clear, the following statements of the cases for and against secured creditor bankruptcies and the corresponding rebuttals and surrebuttals do not necessarily
reflect my views. Instead, my goal is to produce a thorough exposure of
the various plausible policy positions that might persuade a willing, openminded court to follow one path or the other.
My standard for whether an aspect of a secured creditor bankruptcy
is objectionable—or not—is whether that aspect offends a substantial
policy that underlies or is incorporated into the Bankruptcy Code. This is
not an easy task for several reasons. For one thing, although there are
112.
113.

Turscak & Lepene, supra note 92, at 36.
See supra Part II.
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situations in which a secured creditor bankruptcy should not be tolerated, at least in some situations secured creditor bankruptcies should stand.
Presenting a second difficulty, I must take care to hold as many variables
as possible constant while maintaining the focus primarily on the secured
creditor bankruptcy variable. Otherwise, I risk extending the debate to
the whole of bankruptcy law. The goal is to concentrate on what may or
may not be objectionable and not on the particular remedy or procedural
posture (such as whether a substantial asset 363 sale should be approved,
whether a case should be dismissed or converted, or whether a plan fails
to meet the requirements for confirmation). A final difficulty is that I
have not been allocated an unlimited number of pages to tell my story
(or stories).
The paradigm is a Chapter 11 case in which most of the assets are
subject to the secured creditor’s claim, the secured creditor is undersecured, and a sale of the assets is proposed either in a 363 sale or under
a liquidating plan of reorganization. While I realize that not all secured
creditor bankruptcies have fallen into or will fall into this paradigm, most
have and probably will.
B.

The Case Against (or, “It’s the Bankruptcy Code’s Way or the
Highway . . .”114)

It is best first to identify what is not objectionable. Straight liquidation under Chapter 7, with collateral subject to secured creditors’ claims
handled by the trustee, certainly is appropriate.115 Sales under section 363
are appropriate in a Chapter 7 or 11, but only if no incentives or inducements (e.g., gifting or carveouts) are provided to professionals (as existing or future administrative claimants) or other creditors.116 These qualifications imply that there would be some equity in the collateral, thereby
making it worth the trustee’s (or debtor in possession’s) while to deal
with and dispose of it. It follows that there would be at least some value
available for application to administrative expenses and perhaps other
priority and general unsecured claims. Thus, these circumstances would
not amount to a secured creditor bankruptcy as conceived here.
The foregoing identification leaves much that is objectionable. A
Chapter 11 filing as to which the debtor and secured creditor contemplate a sale or other disposition of assets that requires the application of
principles found only in the Bankruptcy Code (such as a 363 sale free
and clear of liens and encumbrances) is objectionable if two additional
circumstances also are contemplated. The first is accomplishment of the
disposition and other related arrangements without the benefit of a plan
of reorganization or by methods not specifically authorized by the Bank114. Cf. RELIENT K, My Way or the Highway . . ., on THE ANATOMY OF THE TONGUE IN CHEEK
(Gotee Records 2006).
115. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–84 (2012).
116. See supra Part II.A, D–E.
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ruptcy Code. The second has two alternative criteria—either the secured
creditor pays or allocates collateral (or its proceeds) to professionals or
creditors as part of an arrangement to induce participation and cooperation (i.e., gifting or carveouts) or the benefits of the case would inure
solely (or nearly so) to the secured creditor. The objection here is based
on policy, not preemption, and the objectionable Chapter 11 filing should
not be permitted or the case should not be maintained.117 The following
discussion addresses the bases for the objection.
Bankruptcy has traditionally been a collective proceeding with the
goal of enhancing recoveries for unsecured creditors beyond those that
state court remedies could provide to the creditors as a body. The mandatory appointment of an unsecured creditors’ committee reflects this
policy.118 Such a collective proceeding aided by the automatic stay also
discourages destruction of a debtor’s operations through the exercise of
state-law collection remedies. A secured creditor bankruptcy lacks this
collective aspect, which lies at the functional core of bankruptcy policy.
A secured party bankruptcy seeks to co-opt what is intended to be a collective proceeding to resolve what is, essentially, a two-party dispute.
The Bankruptcy Code contemplates liquidation under Chapter 7
and reorganization under Chapter 11.119 But many, perhaps most, secured
creditor bankruptcies are functionally indistinguishable from a liquidation that employs the auspices (and tools) of Chapter 11. There is no value for equity holders or unsecured creditors and the secured creditor
simply liquidates its collateral through a nonforeclosure sale in Chapter
11. While the Bankruptcy Code does contemplate liquidating plans, in
many secured creditor bankruptcies a sale is conducted under section 363
as opposed to a liquidation pursuant to a plan of reorganization.120 Moreover, in many cases the proceeds of the 363 sale are distributed outside a
plan.121 Having used the tools provided by the Bankruptcy Code (such as
the automatic stay and 363 sales free and clear) in Chapter 11 (including
operation of the debtor’s business), the debtor is liquidated and the carefully crafted provisions relating to the proposal of a plan of reorganization and leading to ultimate confirmation of a plan are bypassed.122
The Bankruptcy Code provides a specific set of distributional priorities in section 507, with priority claimants (according to their rankings,
117. The objectionable case might support grounds for dismissal based on bad faith or conversion
to Chapter 7. It might also support other remedies or the denial of requested relief. To reiterate the
point made earlier, my goal in this Part is to identify what might (or might not) be objectionable based
on bankruptcy policy and not to focus on particular doctrinal or procedural settings.
118. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). An exception may be made, for cause, in the case of a small business
debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(3).
119. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–84; 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–74.
120. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012).
121. See Shari Siegal, Acquiring All or Part of a Troubled Business, PRAC. LAW., Aug. 2003, at 11,
12–13 (2003), available at http://files.ali-cle.org/thumbs/datastorage/lacidoirep/articles/PL_TPL0308SIEGEL_thumb.pdf (“The advantage of the 363 sale . . . is that it is generally done outside of a plan of
reorganization.”).
122. See id.; 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–74.
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inter se) being awarded priority over general unsecured creditors.123
These can be varied only pursuant to the Chapter 11 plan process. However, in secured creditor bankruptcies the debtor and secured party often
seek to vary the priorities (as well as those among general unsecured
creditors and equity interest holders) through gifting, carveouts, or
both.124 When successful, these private transfer schemes, unblessed and
unregulated by Congress, serve to undermine the absolute priority rule
or to unfairly discriminate,125 thereby returning the process to the bad old
days of pre-absolute priority rule federal equity receiverships.126 The secured creditor reaps benefits from selective application of the Bankruptcy Code, without lobbying for relevant changes in the Bankruptcy Code
and without paying for the use of the bankruptcy courts. By utilizing the
bankruptcy court for its individual gains, the secured creditor effects a
private taking of a public good.
Secured creditor bankruptcies produce results desired by the secured creditor but ignore the state courts, although it is primarily state
law that confers on the secured creditor the benefits of the collateral.
Under Butner, it is state law that generally determines the existence and
nature of property rights.127 But, in a secured creditor bankruptcy, matters of state law such as validity and priority are turned over to the bankruptcy courts.128 Without specific authorization in the Bankruptcy Code
for secured creditor bankruptcies, and given the detailed and specific reorganization provisions in Chapter 11, the power and jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy courts to give effect to these cases is questionable.129
In addition to being objectionable as a matter of bankruptcy policy,
secured creditor bankruptcies simply are not necessary. For collateral
consisting of personal property or fixtures, Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”) section 9-617 provides a secured creditor with sufficient flexibility and protection.130 Under that provision, a secured creditor’s disposition of collateral to a transferee for value following default transfers the
debtor’s rights, discharges the secured creditor’s security interest, and
123. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a). See generally TABB, supra note 6, at 674–86.
124. See supra Part II.D–E.
125. When a plan is involved, secured creditor gifting to a class of general unsecured creditors
also could be employed to induce plan acceptance by an impaired class, thus undermining the safeguard provided by 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2012).
126. For a historical discussion concerning federal equity receiverships, see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR.,
DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 56–70 (2001).
127. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54–55 (1979) (“Property interests are created and defined by state law.”).
128. Id. at 54 n.9 (“The Federal Constitution, Article I, Sec. 8, gives Congress the powers to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy throughout the United States. In view of this grant of
authority to the Congress it has been settled from an early date that state laws to the extent that they
conflict with the laws of Congress, enacted under its constitutional authority, on the subject of bankruptcies are suspended.”).
129. See Law v. Siegel, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 1194–98 (2014) (finding that a bankruptcy court exceeded
its statutory and inherent powers by surcharging debtor’s exempt property and that bankruptcy courts
lack authority to deny an exemption on grounds not specified in Bankruptcy Code).
130. U.C.C. § 9-617 (2014).
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discharges security interests and liens subordinate to that security interest.131 Moreover, a good faith transferee in such a disposition takes free of
such rights and interests (even if the secured creditor failed to comply
with UCC Article 9).132 It follows that a secured creditor can sell
collateral free and clear outside bankruptcy and without relying on section 363.
If and to the extent that a secured creditor wishes or needs the assistance of a court, bear in mind that the bankruptcy courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction133—and Article I courts to boot.134 Bankruptcy courts
can only enter orders consistent with and authorized by the Bankruptcy
Code.135 As argued above, bankruptcy courts may lack the power to effect a secured creditor bankruptcy.136 In contrast, all states have courts of
general jurisdiction, which have the power to deal comprehensively with
the assets and parties before them.137 Moreover, state court judgments
are entitled to full faith and credit in other states and benefit from laws
providing for the domestication and enforcement of foreign judgments.138
Because bankruptcy courts, like state courts, may be limited by the doctrine of successor liability, it is not necessarily the case that a bankruptcy
court’s order or judgment is substantially superior to that of a state
court.139
C.

The Case For (or, “It’s Not Easy Being Secured”140)

A Chapter 11 case should be permitted and should not be dismissed
solely because it benefits only or primarily a secured creditor. However,
maintaining a secured creditor bankruptcy should be subject to appropriate limitations and conditions, which are discussed below.

131. Id.
132. Id. § 9-617(b).
133. Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1194–98.
134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See generally TABB, supra note 6, at 57–58.
135. See Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1194–95.
136. See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
137. Nev. v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 367 (2001) (“A state court’s jurisdiction is general, in that it lays
hold of all subjects of litigation between parties within its jurisdiction . . . .”).
138. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012). See generally, 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS: RES
JUDICATA, § 4467, at 16 (2d ed. 2002) (“The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution provides
that the judicial proceedings of a state shall be given full faith and credit in every other state, and empowers Congress to prescribe the effect of such proceedings.”).
139. Note as well that there is no reason that states could not replicate section 363(f) for sales free
and clear with a broadly applicable statute that would be responsive to the needs of secured creditors.
Special courts for the application of such a statute also could be created. Cf. Court of Chancery Jurisdiction, DEL. STATE COURTS, http://courts.delaware.gov/Chancery/jurisdiction.stm (last visited Nov.
10, 2014) (“In today’s practice, the litigation in the Court of Chancery consists largely of corporate
matters, trusts, estates, and other fiduciary matters, disputes involving the purchase and sale of land,
questions of title to real estate, and commercial and contractual matters in general.”).
140. Cf. Joe Raposo & Jim Henson, Bein’ Green, on SESAME STREET (PBS Kids television broadcast Mar. 10, 1970), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RIOiwg2iHio.
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Bankruptcy law is a subset of civil procedure that does, and should,
vindicate the interests of the holders of legal entitlements in relation to a
debtor in financial distress.141 The principal relevant holders of legal entitlements are creditors and holders of equity interests.142 Secured creditors
are creditors.143 If (1) the only creditor benefited by a Chapter 11 case is
the secured creditor; (2) the secured creditor is better off in the bankruptcy case (e.g., pursuing a 363 sale free and clear); and (3) the treatment of the secured creditor in the case does not make worse off other
creditors, interest holders, or parties in interest, then it is proper to vindicate the secured creditor’s interest in the bankruptcy case. Otherwise,
bankruptcy law would have failed that creditor and failed to achieve its
proper goals. The guiding principle of a secured creditor bankruptcy is
that the secured creditor’s position must be improved and the positions
of other parties in interest must not be worsened.
Consider the following paradigmatic hypothetical. Debtor’s operation of its business in Chapter 11 has prevented the entire loss of the
firm’s going concern value (as would be the case in a Chapter 7 liquidation or secured creditor foreclosure sale). Through a court-approved auction process, the debtor has entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement
(“APA”) with a buyer. One of the terms of the APA, insisted upon by
the buyer, is a 363 sale of substantially all of the debtor’s assets free and
clear of all interests. The buyer intends to continue operation of the
business, including retention of some of the debtor’s current employees.
After satisfaction of all administrative expenses, however, the proceeds
of the sale will be insufficient to permit any distributions to other creditors; all of the net proceeds will be allocated to the secured creditor (as
would be the case in a Chapter 7 liquidation or foreclosure sale of the assets).
Under this hypothetical, the secured creditor has recovered more
that it would in a liquidation or foreclosure, the firm as a going concern
has been preserved (with all of the related benefits, such as preservation
of leases and executory contracts, enhanced benefits for the buyer, and
continued employment), and the other creditors, interest holders, and
parties in interests are not made worse off. Thus, this secured creditor
bankruptcy should be permitted.
That the hypothetical case should be permitted does not mean that
the debtor and secured creditor are entitled to ride roughshod over the
Bankruptcy Code in general or Chapter 11 in particular. In the hypothetical, it simply means that the case should not be dismissed or converted
merely because it is a secured creditor bankruptcy. For example, a 363
sale in a secured creditor bankruptcy should be required to satisfy the
141. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil
Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 937–45 (2004).
142. Id. at 934 n.4.
143. J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213, 225 (1991).
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generally applicable judicially adopted requirements for such a sale, including a business justification. Providing benefits to a secured creditor
(or creditors) that would not be available outside of bankruptcy (e.g.,
protection of going concern value) should constitute a business justification. Or, perhaps the creditors’ committee believes there is some chance
for recoveries beyond the secured creditor’s claim. The committee could
argue that the debtor is not a “melting ice cube,” contrary to the debtor’s
and secured creditors assertions, and that the assets should be sold pursuant to a liquidation plan instead of a 363 sale.144 In a proper case that
argument might well prevail.
Consistent with the guiding principle that a secured creditor bankruptcy should make no stakeholder worse off, a 363 sale or plan confirmation and consummation in a secured creditor bankruptcy should not
render the estate administratively insolvent or increase any administrative insolvency that already might exist. The secured creditor to be benefited should bear the expenses or damages to the estate occasioned by
maintenance of the case for its benefit.
In order to effect this guiding principle, the secured creditor should
be permitted—indeed required—to provide carveouts or gifts to other
parties in interest, so long as the carveout or gift derives from the secured
creditor’ distributions in the case or is deducted from distributions to
which the secured creditor(s) otherwise would be entitled. Stated otherwise, it is the recovery of the secured creditor, and not any other party,
that should be diminished. These carveouts or gifts could be made, for
example, in order to cover administrative expenses (including fees and
expenses of professionals retained by the debtor or committees) or to
provide distributions to a class or type of creditor that otherwise would
not be entitled to the distributions. Because such carveouts or gifts would
derive solely from the entitlements of the secured creditor, the absolute
priority rule would not be offended even if effected through a plan.145
In structuring permissible carveouts or gifts, form should not prevail
over substance. Such arrangements should be permitted, for example, in
connection with distributions of proceeds of a 363 sale or in connection
with a confirmed plan of reorganization. If the secured creditor proposes
to gift a portion of its distribution to another creditor or interest holder
class wholly outside of the secured creditor bankruptcy, the secured creditor should be required to make full disclosure of such a proposal.
In a secured creditor bankruptcy the conduct of the secured creditor
should be held to the same standards as any other party in interest. For
example, proposed payments or gifting that would otherwise disqualify a
plan or support designation for voting purposes would not be insulated
because a case is a secured creditor bankruptcy. The status of a secured
144. See Jacoby & Janger, supra note 32, at 942–43 (“If the debtor is not a melting ice cube, the
proponent will be encouraged to comply with the normal plan process rather than take a shortcut.”).
145. See McDivitt, supra note 63, at 1032, 1036–37.
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creditor bankruptcy as such, however, should not be considered abusive
of bankruptcy policy per se if it otherwise would not be so characterized
and assuming the guiding principles are observed. Of course, the leverage of a secured creditor in a secured creditor bankruptcy may position it
favorably to exercise abusive conduct. But, it is the character of the conduct measured by neutral standards that should be determinative.
D.
1.

Rebuttals and Surrebuttals

Rebuttal of the Case Against and Surrebuttal of the Case For

For present purposes, it is fair to assume that bankruptcy, including
Chapter 11 and its predecessor reorganization and arrangement chapters,
typically has involved a collective proceeding with numerous creditors
and stakeholders with differing priorities.146 Certainly, that is the paradigm that Congress had in mind in providing for the appointment of various types of committees in Chapter 11.147 As Against asserts, a secured
creditor bankruptcy inherently is not that type of collective proceeding
because virtually all of the assets are subject to the secured creditor’s
senior secured claim. However, For must point out that there is nothing
in the Bankruptcy Code that clearly disqualifies such a case from being
maintained. That a secured creditor bankruptcy does not “seem” like the
“traditional” or “typical”148 “collective proceeding” that some bankruptcy mavens may idolize does not provide a rigorous analytical framework
for concluding that secured creditor bankruptcies should not be tolerated. A “no asset” Chapter 7 case also fails to resemble a traditional collective proceeding. There is no distribution to creditors in such a case because there are insufficient assets to result in a distribution. In a secured
creditor bankruptcy there is no distribution to other creditors because
the secured creditor has a first claim on the assets.
In response, Against notes that it is quite appropriate to rely on the
clear legislative purposes of a statute in its interpretation or, when a
court has been given substantial discretion, in its application. A secured
creditor’s enforcement of its lien against its collateral diverges substantially from the purposes of a collective proceeding. A bankruptcy court
may properly take this into account in determining, for example, whether
to dismiss or convert a case.

146. CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, BANKRUPTCY LAW: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND
PRACTICE 452–53 (3d ed. 2010); Brenda Hacker Osborne, Attorneys’ Fees in Chapter 11 Reorganizations: A Case for Modified Procedures, 69 IND. L.J. 581, 588 (1994) (“Because bankruptcy is a collective proceeding, representing the best interests of the estate means taking into consideration the competing interests of multiple parties involved in the bankruptcy.”).
147. See generally Peter C. Blain & Diane Harrison O’Gawa, Creditors’ Committees Under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code: Creation, Composition, Powers, and Duties, 73 MARQ. L.
REV. 581 (1990).
148. Note, however, that some are of the view that secured creditor bankruptcies have become
“typical” or at least not “unusual.”
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Against also points out that a secured creditor bankruptcy is the
functional equivalent of a liquidation that utilizes the advantages of
Chapter 11 without (often) complying with the plan process. The claim is
that such a case utilizes Chapter 11 to address a two-party dispute. Responding, For points to the beneficial wealth enhancement that results
when a Chapter 11 liquidation captures going concern value when compared to a Chapter 7 liquidation or nonbankruptcy foreclosure sale. It
should be of no moment for bankruptcy policy that the wealth is enhanced for the benefit of the secured creditor.149 It is bankruptcy law that
mandates that secured claims be respected and bankruptcy law that recognizes the priority of the secured claim above others.150 Bankruptcy law
serves to vindicate the rights, inter alia, of creditors and the secured creditor is a creditor.151 In many, perhaps most, cases a secured creditor will
prefer to take its collateral and run, leaving a debtor’s bankruptcy case
behind. But, in a secured creditor bankruptcy, the secured creditor
should be the best judge of the means of recovering the most value from
the collateral. And if that judgment favors a disposition in Chapter 11,
that normally should be respected. As to the bypassing of the Chapter 11
plan process, there is nothing special about a secured creditor bankruptcy. The evolving law on substantial asset 363 sales in Chapter 11 should
treat such a case no differently from any others.
Against generally condemns gifting and carveouts as private agreements that amount to an unapproved-by-Congress scheme for selectively
using the Bankruptcy Code for the secured creditor’s benefit, and, in
some instances, in a manner that offends the absolute priority rule and
results in unfair discrimination. The point is that only Congress could authorize such arrangements and that the secured creditor is usurping a
public good (bankruptcy courts) for private benefit. Again, For reiterates
that nothing in the Bankruptcy Code prohibits or even discourages gifting or carveouts.152 So long as creditors and other parties in interest who
are not favored by gifting or carveout are no worse off, bankruptcy
policy—including the absolute priority rule—is respected. For example,
the reasoning behind the unsecured creditor class cramdown requirement that junior classes receive nothing unless the unsecured class is satisfied in full is the logical assumption that if a junior class receives some149. That the wealth enhancement may indirectly benefit existing and future employees and parties that may continue to do business with the debtor’s successor should be of import for bankruptcy
policy, however.
150. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279, 1281 (1997)
(“A longstanding and basic principle of U.S. bankruptcy law is that a secured creditor is entitled to
receive the entire amount of its secured claim—the portion of its bankruptcy claim that is backed by
collateral—before any unsecured claims are paid. This principle of full priority is generally reflected in
the provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code . . . .”).
151. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
152. Richard B. Levin, Almost All You Ever Wanted to Know About Carve Out, 76 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 445, 445 (2002) (stating that the term “‘carve out’ does not derive its substance from any particular
section of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
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thing it necessarily came out of value that should have been distributed to
the unsecured class.153 When it demonstrably is the case that the value received by the junior class is provided by the secured creditor, absolute
priority is not offended.
Moreover, in considering the policies embodied in the Bankruptcy
Code, it is important to keep in mind that absolute priority as established
by Boyd154 and its progeny155 and under Chapter 10 of the Bankruptcy
Act was abandoned by the enactment of Chapter 11 in favor of what
might be dubbed “conditional priority.”156 Unlike prior law, under Chapter 11 the requirement of unanimous consent of a senior class to a deviation from absolute priority no longer applies.157 If the requisite majorities
of a class in amount and number accept a plan, then the minority class
members are bound and need not be crammed-down and do not retain
the power to hold out. Only classes (not creditors) that have not accepted
a plan are entitled to such protection.158 Thus, the notion that a senior
class (such as the secured creditor in a secured creditor bankruptcy) may
give away its entitlements in favor of a junior class is not novel and does
not contravene any fundamental bankruptcy policy.
As for the argument by Against that a secured creditor bankruptcy
offends bankruptcy (or any other) policy by employing the bankruptcy
courts for its private benefit, For responds that the argument either
proves too much or proves nothing. In our system of civil procedure, federal and state governments offer the courts to private parties for the vindication and satisfaction of their private entitlements.159 There are rules
of entry (e.g., jurisdiction and venue rules) and governments possess the
153. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (2012).
154. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 507 (1913) (articulating and applying the absolute priority rule for the first time). See generally TABB, supra note 6, at 1154–55 (discussing Boyd).
155. Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 119 (1939) (applying the fair and equitable
test (the absolute priority rule) on a creditor-by-creditor basis). Case was an example of the old Chapter X holdout problem. In Case, the Supreme Court reversed the confirmation of a reorganization plan
even though it had been approved by more than ninety percent of the creditors. Id. at 132.
156. See Pamela Foohey, Chapter 11 Reorganization and the Fair and Equitable Standard: How
the Absolute Priority Rule Applies to All Nonprofit Entities, ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 31, 45–47 (2012).
157. Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations,
44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 88 (1991) (“The compromise . . . proposed that only classes of creditors could
invoke the [absolute priority] rule. . . . [T]he compromise sought to overrule the procedural protections afforded by Case: under the compromise, an individual creditor who had been outvoted could
not challenge a plan on absolute priority grounds.”). For a brief summary of the history of absolute
priority and the holdout problem, see Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc.
v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1360–61 (7th Cir. 1990). There, Judge Easterbrook stated:
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 required plans of reorganization to be “fair and equitable” but did
not define that phrase. It also allowed creditors to consent to plans that impaired their interests,
but the consent had to be unanimous. The absolute priority rule came into being as a cross between the interpretation of “fair and equitable” and a rule of contract law. . . . .
Everything changed with the adoption of the Code in 1978. The definition of “fair and equitable”
is no longer a matter of common law; § 1129(b)(2) defines it expressly.
Id.
158. See Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and
the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930, 1948 n.47 (2006).
159. See Mooney, supra note 141, at 939, 1025.
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ability to (and do) assess costs on parties for the use of the courts.160 This
is not merely an observation about our courts, it is the whole point of the
courts. In a bankruptcy case, the private rights of stakeholders such as
interest holders and creditors—general unsecured, priority, and secured—are front and center. Their interests are the main point of the
case. A secured creditor in a secured creditor bankruptcy no more usurps
a public good for private gain than any other creditor in a bankruptcy
case or, for that matter, any civil litigant.
In response, Against calls attention to the contrast between an actual distribution of value to a secured creditor and the creditor’s subsequent, voluntary transfer of some of the value to another person outside
of the bankruptcy process, on the one hand, and the distribution to the
other person (facially in violation of the absolute priority rule) under a
plan in the Chapter 11 case, on the other. In the former situation, one can
take comfort that the actual rules of the road in Chapter 11 have been
observed, assuming no other impropriety is involved. The latter may depend on ad hoc allocations and valuations that have been less fully tested.
As to a secured creditor’s use of the bankruptcy courts for its own
gain, Against would emphasize that it is not the use of a court for private
gain in general that is objectionable. Instead, the problem is the use of
the bankruptcy courts, under a statutory framework designed and intended for a collective proceeding, for what is functionally a foreclosure
sale.
The point just made relates in part to the complaint by Against that
secured creditor bankruptcies fail to utilize the more appropriate fora of
state courts to deal with enforcement of security arrangements that are
governed by state law. As a result, secured creditor bankruptcies require
the (federal) bankruptcy courts to deal with and determine issues of state
law that would be better handled by the state courts. Indeed, Against
even questions the power of bankruptcy courts to preside over a secured
creditor bankruptcy.
The argument that, in the abstract, state courts are better suited to
handle enforcement of secured transactions ignores the wealthenhancement virtues of secured creditor bankruptcies that can capture
going concern value. Sales free and clear under section 363(f) offer
greater cleansing power, at least in some jurisdictions.161 A broad interpretation of the “interests” that are cut off in such a sale can serve to en160. See id. at 979 n.220 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012) (concerning jurisdiction in bankruptcy
proceedings); 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2012) (establishing venue in bankruptcy cases); 28 U.S.C. § 1409
(2012) (governing venue of proceedings under, arising in, or related to bankruptcy cases)).
161. See Thomas D. Goldberg, On the Edge: New Decisions Protecting Purchasers of Assets Under
§ 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2003 at 1, 1, available at http://daypitney.
com/news/docs/dbh/news.3299.pdf (“Section 363(f) permits a bankruptcy court to approve the sale of
assets ‘free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate.’ This provision
is highly attractive to purchasers because it ‘cleanses’ the assets, making it more difficult for third parties to assert claims against the assets or the purchaser.”).
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hance the sales price for the assets. The same can be said of the ability to
assume and assign leases and executory contracts in a bankruptcy case.162
As to state courts being better suited, For would emphasize that contract
and property—generally state law issues—are at the very core of any
bankruptcy case. Bankruptcy courts deal with these matters every day.
For rejects the idea that there is a competence gap between the bankruptcy courts and state courts. Indeed, if there is a gap, it is likely to be in
favor of the competence of the bankruptcy courts because of the frequency with which they deal with issues involving secured claims when
compared with state courts of general jurisdiction.163 As to the bankruptcy courts’ powers, in a secured creditor bankruptcy there are no unusual
moves by a bankruptcy court such as surcharging exempt property.
There is simply a 363 sale free and clear or a liquidating plan of reorganization or both.
In response, Against reiterates that the functional equivalent of a
secured creditor foreclosure is an inappropriate role for a Chapter 11
case.
Finally, Against argues that secured creditor bankruptcies are not
necessary because a sale free and clear can be accomplished under state
law pursuant to UCC section 9-617.164 As argued above, however, For
contends that a sale free and clear under section 363(f) may have greater
cleansing power and one plausibly can rely on the secured creditor to
choose the approach that will maximize the value of the collateral. Also,
section 9-617 applies only to personal property and fixtures, not to real
property, and enforcement against real property, including assigned leases, is far more cumbersome.
In response, Against notes that if enforcement remedies for real
property are inadequate then they should be reformed. De facto bankruptcy foreclosure is not the optimal, or even an appropriate, response.
2.

Rebuttal of the Case For and Surrebuttal of the Case Against

The essence of For’s position is that a secured creditor bankruptcy
is justified if and when it results in a Pareto improvement—the secured
creditor is made better off and no one is made worse off.165 As in the going concern hypothetical posited by For, Against acknowledges that certainly it is possible for a secured creditor bankruptcy to have such a beneficial result. But this possibility does not, alone, mean that secured
creditor bankruptcies necessarily reflect good policy.

162. Valuable leases and executor contract can be assumed and assigned under section 365. 11
U.S.C. § 365(a)–(b), (f) (2012).
163. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
164. U.C.C. § 9-617 (2014).
165. Economic Definition of Pareto improvement. Defined., ECON. GLOSSARY, http://glossary.
econguru.com/economic-term/Pareto+improvement (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
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Continuing with that hypothetical, Against suggests consideration
of some additional hypothetical facts. As is typical, the buyer party to the
APA was a stalking horse bidder and the APA was entered into before
or early on in the case. The secured creditor and the (cooperative) debtor in possession assert that the terms of the APA (including the purchase
price) are fair. A bidding procedure was established that could allow
competing bids for the assets, but no competing bids are received. The
bankruptcy court is confronted with the “melting ice cube” argument and
consequently faces substantial pressure to approve the procedures, the
APA, and the 363 sale. The court does so.
But what if this is not a secured creditor bankruptcy because the
debtor is not a melting ice cube? Consistent with that, Against asks
whether a substantially greater sales price could be negotiated by slowing
the process and conducting a sale under a confirmed plan of reorganization? In the typical case of an early 363 sale, those possibilities will never
be explored fully. Perhaps the central problem here is the power of a
dominant secured creditor that asserts that there is a melting ice cube
and no possibility of recoveries for the unsecured creditors coupled with
a bankruptcy court that is unwilling to roll the dice by delaying the process. This may be exacerbated by the difficulties objecting creditors
would face in blocking the sale or forcing a renegotiation. In this connection, a recent empirical study provides strong evidence that 363 sales
fetch considerably smaller sales prices than sales under plans.166 The authors demonstrate that the principal cause of the discounted prices in 363
sales is not the speed with which they are conducted early on in cases,
but instead the creditors’ lack of sufficient leverage when compared to
plan sales involving mandatory disclosure and creditor acceptances of a
plan.167
In response, For would note that the foregoing does not support the
position of Against, which in the hypothetical would advocate dismissal
or conversion and would not permit gifting in support of administrative
expenses. The real point to be made here, perhaps, is that courts should
be wary of substantial asset 363 sales. The recent study discussed above
did not focus on secured creditor bankruptcies, however. If the secured
creditor truly is under-secured, then absent collusion or self-dealing, the
secured creditor would have incentives to seek the highest possible sales
price. There would be no need, then, for the leverage of unsecured creditors in the plan process inasmuch as the secured creditor would already
have an incentive to maximize its recovery.

166. Anne M. Anderson & Yung-Yu Ma, Acquisitions in Bankruptcy: 363 Sales Versus Plan Sales
and the Existence of Fire Sales, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 2–3, 13–17 (2014).
167. Id. at 3, 15–17.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Against and For have had their say. Now it is my turn.
My conclusion is that the absolute bar on secured creditor bankruptcies advocated by Against is untenable. Secured creditor bankruptcies can preserve wealth in the form of going concern value and otherwise maximize recoveries for the beneficiary secured creditor, while
imposing all costs of that preservation on the secured creditor and respecting the most important principles underlying Chapter 11. But secured creditor bankruptcies should be permitted only subject to carefully
drawn limitations, as advocated by For.
Secured creditor bankruptcies have the potential to work great mischief by removing (in large part) various adversarial aspects of the Chapter 11 process. Courts have been and should be cautious about any substantial asset 363 sale early on in a case. Courts should be alert for
potential abuses of the process. But the prohibition of all secured creditor bankruptcies based solely on the potential for abuse seems wholly
unwarranted. Let us hope that through the developing case law courts
will be up to the task of allowing bankruptcy law to realize its proper
goals.

